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1. Introduction : Mining Towns as Critical Locations of
(Violent) Political Struggle in the DRC
1 On June 19,  2014,  a  local  radio station Amani (‘peace’  in Swahili)  was inaugurated in
Rubaya, a mining town situated in the hills of Masisi, North Kivu, in Eastern Congo. The
inauguration ceremony, which took place in heavy rain, was widely attended, not least by
a big delegation of Congolese government representatives. As part of a larger project on
community peace consolidation set up by the American NGO Search for Common Ground,
Radio Amani was financed by the Japanese government and launched in cooperation with
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  and the UN peacekeeping force
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUSCO).  In  front  of  the  cameras  and  microphones  documenting  this  mediatised
event, donors, provincial ministers, as well as local inhabitants expressed their hopes that
this  ‘intercommunity  radio’,  an  ‘apolitical  radio  of  proximity’,  would  bring  together
people  from  different  communities  to  overcome  distrust  and  violence  and  to  build
together on the consolidation of peace in the region.1 
2 The event is informative of the general image of the mining town of Rubaya, a site of
interethnic land conflicts, rebel rule and a militarised economy of natural resources. It
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presents  one  of  those  local  sites  at  which  the  broader  dynamics  of  violent  conflict
characterising Eastern Congo’s Kivu provinces come together and are being translated
into local precarities, conflicts and violent livelihoods. The choice of Rubaya as one of the
stations for the intercommunity peace-building radio project is further informed by the
fact that this mining town presents an ideal site for a broad reach : in contrast to its rural
surroundings, Rubaya is marked by a dense demographic concentration and a relatively
well-developed radio and mobile data network. With its estimated 70,000 inhabitants, this
mining town is a crowded centre, where miners, traders, state officials, IDPs (internally
displaced persons) and taxi drivers from very different places and ethnic backgrounds
meet in search of livelihoods, protection or leisure. Further, the event also points at the
position of this mining town on the map of international humanitarian, development and
peace-building interventions. The presence of IDP camps in the vicinity of the town, but
especially the militarisation of artisanal mining activities, has attracted the attention of
several international actors. In recent years, several NGOs, advocacy organisations and
activists have engaged in the struggle against so-called conflict minerals. Since it is the
first North Kivu ‘sector’ in the so-called traceability process,2 Rubaya has been put on the
international map by a wide variety of researchers, activists, journalists and NGO staff.
Rubaya’s appearance in US campaigns, for example, has largely reproduced the dominant
narrative of ‘blood minerals’ and interethnic conflict (Vogel and Radley, 2014).
3 As the presence of Congolese state representatives at the inauguration ceremony shows,
it is not only on the international level that Rubaya is clearly on the map. The presence of
important economic and military ‘big men’ (owning, for example, much of the land on
which Rubaya is developing) with ties in Goma as well as in the capital city, Kinshasa,
makes this place less ‘remote’ than it seems and it actually becomes a nodal point in
politico-military networks of power and control. At the same time, the presence of state
representatives  at  the  ceremony  is  contradictory.  Despite  the  state’s  economic  and
political interest in the town, not even the minimum in terms of state investment has
been made in Rubaya’s development. As is the case for other mining boomtowns (and any
other form of  urbanisation)  in the region,  the Congolese state is  rather absent  from
processes of urbanisation, planning or infrastructure provision. Inauguration ceremonies,
performed with grotesque grandeur by Congolese ministers who have never invested one
single  dollar  in  projects  or  places  like  this,  have  become  painful  moments  of
magnification of state failure and the transfer of the state’s legitimacy to other actors,
such as international donors (Trefon, 2011).  Instead of being the result of a state-led
urbanisation process, mining towns like Rubaya are the outcome of a complex interaction
of different kinds of agency, in which non-state actors play an important role. 
4 Rubaya’s development is not unique in the region. It is one of several urban centres that
developed around artisanal mining sites and were transformed into boomtowns during
the early 2000s. Rising market values of minerals such as cassiterite and coltan attracted
many people to dig in the mines ; at the same time, violent clashes between different
armed groups pushed IDPs into these centres  in search of  security and a livelihood.
Increasing economic activity has transformed the town into a vibrant commercial centre,
with its packed houses, its colourful shops and its noisy bars standing in sharp contrast to
its  rural  surroundings.  Boomtowns  such  as  Rubaya  illustrate  the  profound
reconfiguration  of  the  Kivu  landscape  in  a  context  of  war,  violence,  repeated
displacement and transforming livelihoods. Over the past twenty years, Eastern DRC has
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become  increasingly  urbanised,  strongly  affecting  local  economies,  administrations,
landscapes, cultures and identities (Büscher, 2015 ; 2016). 
5 When places like Rubaya, Kamituga, Numbi or Nyabibwe are mentioned in the academic
and policy literature on Eastern DRC, the focus is put on their artisanal mining activity
and  its  role  in  the  broader  political  economy  of  natural  resources  (Cuvelier,  2010 ;
Geenen, 2014 ;  Radley and Vogel,  2015 ;  Vogel and Raeymaekers, 2016).  While a lot of
attention has been given to local livelihoods and the different forms of agency behind the
natural  resource  economies  and  networks,  the  dynamics  of  boomtown  urbanisation
around these artisanal mines have gone largely unstudied. Instead of the mine itself,
mineral extraction and the mine’s artisanal miners, this chapter focuses on the town that
has  developed  around  them.  Its  urbanisation  will  be  perceived  as  a  dynamic,
transformative process in its own right. In the current Congolese context of a confusing,
half-implemented  decentralisation  law,  the  expansion  of  the  centre  itself  becomes  a
highly  political  process,  involving  different  state  and  non-state  actors  at  the  local,
provincial and national levels. It will be argued that in this political context of war, the
establishment,  expansion  and  administrative  recognition  of  these  centres  represent
important political,  economic and social  resources for multi-scalar alliances of  elites,
customary authorities, armed groups and the Congolese state in their broader political
struggles for power, legitimacy and control. Mining boomtowns represent, for example,
significant bases for taxation, electoral politics and ethnic mobilisation. 
6 By presenting mining towns as not only spatial but also analytical starting points from
which to  study  dynamics  of  power  and (violent)  control  in  the  Kivu  provinces,  this
chapter  speaks  to  both  academic  and policy  debates.  For  both  debates,  this  chapter
wishes to add an urban dimension to the study of the relationship between conflict and
mineral extraction. Academically, the chapter contributes to discussions of urbanity and
its ‘critical significance’ in settings of war (Beall et al., 2011). In Congo’s Kivu provinces,
urban sites embody ‘safe’ spatial environments for IDPs or refugees, at the same time
being safe havens or strongholds for rebel movements, strategic targets, economic hubs,
or hotspots for the humanitarian industry (Büscher, 2016). Further, this chapter adds a
missing spatial and particularly urban element to the current debates on violent conflict
and the production of public authority in Eastern DRC (Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, 2014).
As  complex ‘laboratories’  (Robinson,  2006 ;  Simone,  2004),  urban centres  embody the
spatial, political, social and economic agency of a wide range of actors (state and non-
state, formal and informal, public and private, civil and armed). As the chapter illustrates,
the distinction between these categories is in reality extremely blurred. With regard to
policy debates,  the chapter draws attention to the crucial political character of these
places  as  well  as  of  their  urbanisation  process.  Different  actors  involved  in  their
regulatory frameworks are in fierce competition over power and control, a competition
that is often violently mobilised along ethnic lines. 
7 This paper is based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork carried out (by the author and/
or by Congolese colleagues) between 2010 and 2017 in Numbi, Nyabibwe (South Kivu) and
Rubaya (North Kivu). Fieldwork in these different sites consisted of in-depth interviews
with key stakeholders (administrative and customary authorities, members of local civil
society, heads of mining and commercial associations, representatives of the Congolese
security forces and NGO staff), focus-group discussions with different target groups (such
as,  for  example,  miners,  traders  and  transporters),  social  mapping  exercises,  the
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consultation  of  local  administrative  reports,  observational  walks  and  informal
discussions. 
 
2. Mining Urbanisation in the DRC 
8 It  is  only  recently  that  in  academic  writings  special  attention  has  been paid  to  the
complex  relation  between  mining  and  urbanisation  in  Africa.  While  much  has  been
written on mining and land use/conflicts, mining and mobility, as well as on mining and
human settlement patterns, the connection between mining and urban transformation
has been largely ignored. Yet both processes make an important contribution to Africa’s
current  transformation  of  local  societies  in  a  global  era,  as  they  both  produce
fundamental demographic, economic, spatial and sociocultural changes. The first attempt
to bring together specific studies on the intersection of mining and urbanisation in Africa
was  made  by  Bryceson and MacKinnon (2012) :  from a  collection  of  case  studies  on
Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and the DRC, the editors centred
their  analysis  around  what  they  call  ‘mineralised  urbanisation’,  or  the  influence  of
mineral  production  cycles  and  commodity  chains  on  urban  growth  and  settlement
patterns at local, regional and national levels. On the one hand, these studies present a
clear  picture  of  the  diverse  settlement  trajectories,  livelihoods  and welfare  paths  of
mining towns ;  on the other  hand,  they make an important  attempt to  examine the
current sense of ‘mining place’ (Bryceson and MacKinnon, 2012, 514). 
9 The issue of mining urbanisation also occupies a central place in the broader theoretical
debates on the interaction between global markets and rural–urban dynamics and shifts.
In their edited volume, Agergaard et al.  (2010) analyse trends of mining urbanisation
within the context of the ‘frontier’, being a region where linkages to global markets are
dominated by one particular economic product. Just like other frontier economies (such
as cash crop economies linked to the world market), mining frontiers are particularly
dynamic  spaces  characterised  by  rapid  changes  in  demographic  structure,  economic
basis, occupational opportunities, settlement patterns and land use, where one observes
livelihoods being transformed through the establishment of new commercial activities
(Agergaard et al.,  2010,  3).  These dynamics strongly impact rural–urban linkages and
processes of urbanisation, metamorphosing from remote ‘deep rural’ to pulsating urban
centres of goods and services provision (Bryceson and Mwaipopo, 2010, 158). The concept
of  frontier  urbanisation  enables  us  to  investigate  mining  towns  in  Eastern  DRC  as
distinctive political, economic and sociocultural spaces (Werthmann and Grätz, 2012) as
well as spaces of intense transformation. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully
engage with the frontier literature on Eastern DRC, but it reinforces our understanding of
frontier  towns  as  spaces  marked  by  fierce  (often  violent)  contest  over  control  and
authority  in  the  geographic  periphery  of  the  state,  yet  often  at  its  political  centre
(Raeymaekers,  2014).  Further,  the  literature  enables  us  to  see  those  places  as nodes
within  the  political  projects  of  a  wide  range  of  actors,  such  as  miners,  mining
cooperatives, all sorts of local, national and foreign corporations and governments, NGOs,
and  numerous  middlemen,  all  of  them  negotiating  local  governance  (Vogel  and
Raeymaekers, 2016).
10 A  number  of  researchers  has  been  inspired  to  ethnographically  study  the  unique
environment of  these boomtowns and the identities,  cultures and lifestyles that they
develop  (De  Boeck,  2001 ;  Werthmann  and  Grätz,  2012).  The  case  studies  of  Numbi,
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Nyabibwe, and Rubaya largely correspond with the findings of this research and of the
literature on mining urbanism in general. Attractive because of their ‘frontier mystique’
(Agergaard et  al.,  2010)  and as  centres of  rapid in-migration,  these settlements have
served as ‘destinations of desire’ (Bryceson and Mwaipopo, 2010, 168), setting in motion
dynamics  of  change,  rapid  growth  and  expansion.  With  a  few  exceptions,  (see,  for
example, Büscher  et  al.,  2014 ;  De  Boeck,  2001 ;  Kabamba,  2012 ;  Vlassenroot  and
Raeymaekers, 2004 ; Vwakyanakazi, 1992), mining urbanisation in the DRC has not been
explicitly documented. Yet the academic interest in artisanal mining in the DRC is well
developed, and several researchers have extensively studied the ways in which, in the
context of state crisis and civil war, artisanal mining has become a livelihood strategy for
very different civil and military actors (see, for example, Ansoms and Marysse, 2011 ;
Bashwira, 2017 ; Geenen, 2013). The Kivu provinces, where this research is located, are
extremely  rich  in  natural  resources  such  as  gold,  colombo-tantalite  (coltan)  and
cassiterite  (tin).  At  the  same  time,  these  provinces  have  been  characterised  by  a
protracted situation of violent conflict.  The dwindling power and role of formal state
institutions have been the result of a profound economic and political crisis that was
already set in motion in the mid-1990s at the end of the Mobutu era. A civil war that
started in the second half of the 1990s has evolved over the last 20 years into a complex
jumble of dynamics of violence and conflict and a proliferation of armed groups in the
Kivu  provinces.  During  the  different  episodes  of  the  war,  mining  towns  have  been
strongly influenced by dynamics of forced displacement, violence and militarisation. The
massive arrival  of  Hutu refugees in 1994,  fleeing Rwanda (after the political  changes
following  the  end  of  the  genocide),  strongly  impacted  on  such  towns’  demographic
composition,  local  economies  and  political  constellations.  As  has  been  extensively
documented, these 1994 dynamics set in motion the start of a series of violent conflicts in
the broader region (see, for example, Turner, 2007), and throughout the war towns like
Numbi and Nyabibwe have been an operational ground for multiple armed groups.
11 Dynamics of violence and conflict have produced social transformation and generated a
number of important shifts in the socio-economic sphere (Vlassenroot and Raeymeakers,
2004, 14). These shifts, with regard to issues such as access to land and the structure of
public authoritym for example, should not be explained as temporary effects of a context
of violence and war but as elements of a general transformation of local society. In earlier
works I have argued that rural–urban shifts and the emergence of boomtowns in the Kivu
provinces should be understood as a spatial aspect of this transformative power of violent
conflict (Büscher, 2011 ; 2016). This transformation of peripheral rural mining sites into
urbanised  centres  of  (largely  informal)  accumulation  and  survival  has  resulted  in  a
profound socio-economic, spatial and political reorganisation of local society. 
12 The  thriving  forces  behind  the  fast  expansion  of  these  mining  agglomerations  are
multiple, and a combination of structural processes and people’s agency. Like booming
mining towns elsewhere, not only does the arrival of large groups of artisanal miners
gave  a  considerable  boost  to  local  economic  activity  (Cuvelier,  2010 ;  Walsh,  2003 ;
Werthmann, 2003), these boomtowns also serve as a place of refuge for people seeking to
rebuild their lives after having been marginalised in their communities of origin (Fisher,
2007 ;  Grätz,  2009 ;  Werthmann,  2009).  Kivu’s  mining towns have attracted important
numbers of rural poor and urban unemployed in search of their fortunes, but at the same
time the ongoing violence has pushed large parts of the rural population to the same
centres in search of physical security (Vlassenroot and Raeymakers, 2004, 143)3. Mining
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towns often form attractive ‘safe havens’ for refugees (coming from Rwanda) and IDPs
(coming from Kivu’s rural hinterlands), who settle in camps or in the town itself. The
more these centres grow and develop, the more miners and IDPs have been followed by
an influx of all kinds of other ‘migrants’ seeking to integrate into and invest in these
emerging semi-urban economies. This has led (in some cases more than others) to the
creation of an ethnically and economically diverse demography, the development of new
markets, increased circulation of money and goods and the spontaneous development of
infrastructure  and services.  Traders,  transporters,  hotel  and bar  managers,  butchers,
pharmacists, etc. gradually settle and start their businesses in these highly populated
spaces. Although much of the mining extraction itself is largely carried out by men, these
boomtowns are far from being a ‘man’s world’, and women play important roles in local
economies and occupy a variety of positions (Bashwira et al., 2014)4. In a short time, these
former  villages  transform into  booming  agglomerations  with  an  increasingly  ‘urban’
character (Büscher et al., 2014 ; Mususa, 2012). What makes these places ‘urban’ or ‘semi-
urban’  is  not  only  a  matter  of  demographic  size  and density ;  it  is  also  a  matter  of
demographic  composition,  economic  accumulation,  livelihood  diversification,  public
service  provision,  settlement  patterns  and  political  organisation  (Dobler,  2009 ;
Werthmann, 2009). 
13 A  fact  that  is  often  overlooked  in  academic  debates  is  that  the  process  of  mining
urbanisation is not only a demographic, administrative, spatial and economic process, but
is a political process as well. This chapter, analysing mining boomtowns in a context of
violent  conflict,  will  contribute  to  the  understanding  of  the  politics  of  mining
urbanisation and boomtown urbanisation in general. Through a long history of political
and  economic  crisis  and  war,  mining  urbanism  came  to  involve  particular  types  of
stakeholders—formal  and  informal,  civilian  and  military.  This  particular  setting
generates distinctive patterns of urbanisation, settlement, governance and livelihoods,
generating an urbanisation process that  is  often of  a  highly unstable and conflictual
nature (Büscher, forthcoming). 
14 Further,  this  urbanisation process  is  inevitably  interwoven with agendas  of  political,
military and ethnic mobilisation. To recognise mining urbanisation as a political process,
it  is  important  to  understand  the  mining  town  as  the  spatial  arena  of  political
constellations  and  to  understand  the  process  of  urbanisation  as  a  part  of  political
mechanisms.  A  case  illustrative  of  the  political  aspect  of  the  urbanisation  of  these
boomtowns is the process of their administrative transformation from the status of a
‘centre’ or village, towards the status of a ‘commune’. According to the decentralisation
law  of  the  DRC,  agglomerations  change  administrative  status  according  to  their
demographic statistics. With, for example, more than 20,000 inhabitants, a village can be
recognised as a ‘commune’. From our cases, it will become clear how this process is more
than an administrative mechanism : it is a highly political issue, creating fierce power
contestation and conflicts.
 
3. The Case of Nyabibwe and Numbi (Kalehe, South
Kivu)
15 Kalehe territory in South Kivu has served as a case study to look at a variety of conflict
dynamics that have become hot topics in the literature and in knowledge production with
regard to the war in Eastern DRC, such as the proliferation of armed groups (Hoffmann
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and Vlassenroot,  2014),  the  struggle  over  citizenship  (Vlassenroot,  2013),  land issues
(Ansoms et  al.,  2012)  and the political  economy of  natural  resources  (Jackson,  2006 ;
Cuvelier, 2010). Until the present, the region has been characterised by the mobilisation
of  armed groups,  strong ethnic  tensions,  violent  struggles  over  public  authority  and
militarised land conflicts.  In the early years  of  the new millennium,  during the RCD
rebellion5 that  coincided with the global  boom in demand for  coltan and cassiterite,
several boomtowns emerged around artisanal mining sites in Kalehe. Both Nyabibwe and
Numbi have experienced spectacular growth over the last  two decades,  transforming
from small villages into extended ‘urbanised’ agglomerations. 
16 Nyabibwe, with approximately 25,000 inhabitants in 20156, is situated on the main road
that runs along the shores of Lake Kivu and connects the two main cities in the Kivu
region : Goma (capital city of North Kivu province) and Bukavu (capital of South Kivu
province). The town emerged in proximity to the Kalimbi mines, which were exploited
from the mid-1970s on, in an industrial manner. From the end of the 1980s, detrimental
economic nationalisation policies in Zaire, and further economic decay throughout the
1990s,  resulted  in  the gradual  informalisation  of  mineral  extraction.  The  ‘big  boom’
occurred  in  2000‒01,  when  the  war  pushed,  and  global  mineral  prices  attracted,
thousands of miners to the town, resulting in a quadrupling of its population. The town
distinguishes itself from its rural surroundings by its ‘cosmopolitan’ character, including
the different ethnic groups to be found in the region. Hutu comprise the largest group,
and other well-represented communities are Havu, Tembo, Bashi and Tutsi. A historical
friction between, on the one hand, Hutu and, on the other, Tembo and Havu has been
reinforced  by  dynamics  of  conflict  and  militarisation.  Administratively,  Nyabibwe  is
governed by two layers of authority : customary (traditional) authority in the form of a
customary chief, and state (administrative) authority in the form of a chef du poste. The
former is traditionally the realm of the Tembo and Havu community, while the latter is
locally elected and thus represents the Hutu majority. In light of regional (violent) ethnic
politics, this fragmented leadership has been often conflictual. Mining activities have had
an  important  impact  on  the  local  leadership ;  the  mining  cooperatives  Coopérative
Minière de Kalimbi (COMIKA) and Coopérative Minière du Bien-Être Communautaire de
Kalehe (COOMBECKA), who control and govern these activities, have an important stake
in local politics, and are in their turn strongly influenced by regional and national elites
in the larger cities of Goma and Bukavu (Cuvelier, 2013). 
17 Numbi, with an estimated number of inhabitants between 10,000 and 11,0007, is situated
in the highlands (Hauts Plateaux) of Kalehe, some 30 km from the main road that runs
along Lake Kivu. Compared to Nyabibwe (which is located on the main road) and because
of almost non-existent road access (most of the time it inaccessible to cars), Numbi is an
extremely  isolated  place.  It  is  surrounded  by  huge  pasture  concessions,  owned  by
influential Tutsi elites that emerged during the RCD rebellion (1998‒2004). As we observe
in other mining towns,  the involvement of  such politico-military elites,  connected to
local, provincial, national and even trans-border power networks, strongly contests the
‘isolated’ nature of the place. Administered under the status of a ‘village’, it is headed by a
customary  chief  from  the  Tutsi  community  and  a  state  authority  from  the  Tembo
community.  As is the case in Nyabibwe, a fierce conflict between these two layers of
authority over the control of the town (and crucial mechanisms such as land distribution
or taxation revenues) has known very violent episodes. During the RCD period, as part of
the group’s efforts to establish its parallel administration, Numbi was administratively
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‘upgraded’ and came under the control of a Tutsi chief close to the rebel movement. In
2006, after the peace process and the country’s reunification, this chief was replaced by a
Hutu chief. In 2012, the former Tutsi chief, by influencing provincial political and ex-rebel
elites in Bukavu, regained control thanks to the appointment of his own brother as the
new chief. The local Hutu population, who perceived this as an orchestrated Tutsi coup
d’état,  strongly  opposed  his  rule,  a  situation  which  created  strong  ethnic  tensions8.
Further,  Numbi  is  known for  its  violent  land conflicts,  which are  being significantly
politicised by elites (urban-based elites in Goma, for example) through the political and
military connections of the landowners (Ansoms et al., 2012). As was equally the case for
Nyabibwe, mining activities in the nearby pits had been informalised since the 90s, and
were very small scale. Also similarly, a mining boom occurred at the turn of the new
millennium. 
18 Much  of  its  urbanisation  process  initially  unfolded  in  an  organic,  spontaneous  and
unplanned way, yet various actors have increasingly tried to incorporate the process, as a
spatial mechanism of control, into their own political or economic ambitions. In Numbi,
local elites have, on the one hand, tried to invest in a minimum of infrastructure (to
anticipate an administrative upgrade within the decentralisation process—see below). On
the other hand, rumours circulate about other elites at the provincial and national level
blocking investments in urban expansion (such as the road, which is in a perpetual state
of disrepair), to prevent external actors, including the Congolese state, from interference9
.
19 Numbi and,  to a lesser extent,  Nyabibwe are situated in areas that have experienced
significant levels of armed mobilisation for at least two decades. Both ‘autochthonous’
militia (such as Mai-Mai groups in the second Congo war and Raia Mutomboki factions
thereafter) as well as different trajectories of Congolese Hutu mobilisation (branches of
the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO) and, more recently, different
Nyatura  groups)  deploy  a  degree  of  influence  to  these  urban  centres  and  their
surroundings. Violent and militarised struggle for control over these centres of course
needs to be understood in the light of their strategic significance as mining towns. From
2010 onwards, Nyabibwe was selected as one of the first pilot cases for the ‘traceability
process’ organised by the International Tin Research Institute (ITRI)10. In Numbi, which is
far less state controlled and more isolated, armed groups like Nyatura were, until 2012
involved in taxation mechanisms applied to mining incomes, although not present in the
mines themselves. Until the present day, despite the different disarmament initiatives,
the circulation of arms remains an important challenge, and local,  everyday conflicts
often escalate as violence remains an important means in daily livelihood strategies11. 
20 The  urbanisation  process  of  these  towns  was  further  shaped  by  the  vast  influx  of
internally displaced people. In both Nyabibwe and Numbi, IDPs settled within the mining
agglomeration. Many of them went to work in the mines, others integrating into other
economic sectors. In Nyabibwe, for example, IDPs coming from Masisi introduced ‘new’
commercial  activities  such  as  the  exploitation  of  small  cafeterias  where  people  can
consume milk and a small breakfast. Apart from mining, inhabitants of Nyabibwe and
Numbi are engaged in a number of secondary activities, such as small trading in staple
goods, transport, trading in wood, and—of course—in the proliferation of very lucrative
activities catering for the food and entertainment needs of the mine workers. With a
purchasing power far in excess of farmers in the surrounding countryside, the presence
of  miners  in  these  towns  has  resulted  in  the  emergence  of  a  highly  profitable
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‘entertainment infrastructure’ and a sharp increase of the numbers of bars, cinemas and
restaurants since the start of the new millennium12. It is this proliferation of secondary
activities (butchers’ shops, hairdressers, other shops), services (pharmacies, hotels) and
entertainment infrastructure (cinemas, bars) and the large diversity of traded products
that shape these mining towns’ semi-urban character. As local traders in Nyabibwe told
me : ‘today in Nyabibwe one can find almost everything one can find in the city’13. One
example of an economic sector that spectacularly expanded due to the process of mining
urbanisation was the transport sector. Operating motorcycle taxis is a lucrative livelihood
option for many youngsters and IDPs,  as well as an attractive market for investment
because of its high returns14. This economic transformation went hand in hand with a
material  reconfiguration  of  the  villages’  landscapes,  increasingly  evolving  towards
‘urbanised’  settlements  (with  ‘durable’  housing  materials,  multi-storey  houses  and
relatively extensive infrastructure). 
21 The expansion of these dynamic mining towns did not only attract armed groups, miners,
traders  and  IDPs ;  it  also  encouraged  the  Congolese  state  to  settle  at  these  sites,
presenting—as they do—interesting economic and political opportunities. In Nyabibwe,
from around 2005 onwards, state offices increasingly installed themselves in the town,
opening local branches of the Divisions of Hygiene, Tourism, Urbanisation, etc. In fact,
these branches are often no more than a barely equipped ‘office’ (often a small wooden
room)  run  by  badly  paid  staff.  The  official  discourse  of  ‘better  coordinating  and
organizing the town’s expansion and urbanisation’15 masks the real desires to get a piece
of  the  massive  cash flows  and financial  interests  generated by  these  boomtowns.  In
Numbi, not only established elites but also new big men (most of them with high ranking
positions in the Congolese army) have heavily invested in real estate. Most of the houses
and hotels  are  owned by  colonels,  captains,  and others  in  the  Armed Forces  of  the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC)—investments that somehow ‘assure’ the local
population of a stable future16. 
22 In 2013, in the context of the decentralisation reforms17, Nyabibwe was in the process of
being recognised as a ‘commune’ in a decree from the central government. On June 13,
the First Minister of the central government and the Minister of the Interior signed the
decree,  fixing  the  geographic  limits  of  the  agglomeration18.  The  transformation  of
Nyabibwe into a commune is the direct consequence of its growth. The law, on paper,
grants  an important  degree of  autonomy to the decentralised entity,  in  terms of  its
governance  of  human,  economic  and  financial  resources  (Englebert,  2012).  One
consequence of this shift was that the customary authorities would lose administrative
control to an elected state agent or a ‘bourgemestre’. Afraid he would lose the right to
collect fees, taxes and royalties on mining and other commercial activities in the most
important economic centre of  his chieftaincy,  the customary chief  undertook various
steps to preserve his influence. Büscher et al. (2014) have described in detail how, by for
example influencing ‘connected’  politicians on the provincial  level  or by strategically
selling off his land and intervening in the local political economy of the town’s mining
activities, the chief’s strategies of maintaining power and authority have laid the basis for
further  local  political  conflicts.  In  the  meantime,  the  decentralisation  law  has  been
suspended.  Since  2014,  Numbi  has  been  waiting  to  also  be  granted  the  status  of  a
‘commune’, yet until this day this process has not been further implemented as local
elections are repeatedly postponed. As I will further demonstrate through the case of
Rubaya, this half-implemented decentralisation law creates confusion, offering room for
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manoeuvre that enables the state and other actors, such as economic and military big
men,  to  exercise  their  power  over  these  places.  Urbanisation  is  in  itself  a  process
characterised by contestation ; these political mechanisms have strongly reinforced these
conflicts. 
 
4. The Case of Rubaya (Masisi, North Kivu) 
23 Rubaya, a town currently estimated to have a population of 70,00019, is situated in Masisi
(North Kivu), a region known for its violent history of identity politics. Originally, Rubaya
emerged around a transit point for Rwandan labourers ‘exported’ into Congo (Hutu and
Tutsi ; today locally referred to as ‘Banyarwanda’) by the Belgian colonisers in the 1930s
and  40s  to  sustain  the colonial  plantation  economy  in  the  Masisi  highlands.  Ethnic
tensions between these Banyarwanda and the so-called autochthonous populations (status
claimed by people from the Hunde and Tembo community) rose in the aftermath of the
Rwandan genocide,  when hundreds  of  thousands  of  Hutu  sought  refuge  in  the  Kivu
provinces. Their arrival in Rubaya caused many Tutsi and Hunde to flee20, and in parallel
with the wider region had a general destabilising effect. 
24 Rubaya  knew  its  real  ‘boom’  phase  during  the  RCD  period,  when  coltan  had  been
discovered  three  kilometres  from  the  town’s  centre.  Local  big  men  from  the  Hutu
community saw their positions reinforced by the political–economic Hutu elite that was
installed in  the  North Kivu province under  the provincial  governor  Eugène Serufuli,
controlling the main administrative posts and key economic sectors21. In this period of
rapid expansion, several neighbourhoods were constructed and the reconfiguration of
Rubaya’s  landscape  was  also  visible  in  the  transformation  of  wooden  shacks  into
constructions in  more  durable  housing  materials  and  the  erection  of  multi-storey
buildings. In 2001 Rubaya was administratively recognised as a commercial centre and a
chef de centre was appointed from the provincial administration. Eugène Serufuli himself
invested in the centre with the installation of a radio mast22. 
25 The National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) rebellion introduced a new
phase of  military  conflict  in  Rubaya,  with heavy clashes  between the  CNDP and the
Congolese army as well as the PARECO armed group. As one of the CNDP’s strongholds,
mining activities were controlled by the Congress and the town of Rubaya was governed
through a parallel rebel administration, which ‘elevated’ it to the administrative status of
a ‘cité’ (resulting, amongst other things, in more power and autonomy for rebel-appointed
officials over customary authorities)23. Even today, armed groups such as Nyatura and the
Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS)24 remain active in Rubaya’s
immediate proximity (United Nations Security Council,  2015). This complex history of
violent  conflict,  in  which  the  town  has  occupied  different  positions,  from  rebel
stronghold to a safe haven for IDPs, has generated a process of urbanisation that is highly
militarised. Now that armed groups are no longer physically present in the town itself, a
heavy presence from police and soldiers has taken over25. Rubaya, just like Numbi, suffers
from a vast proliferation of arms among its inhabitants. This results in a constant fear of
violence and casualties in the case of (even very banal) conflicts26. Rumours regarding the
creation of a new rebel movement in Rubaya are illustrative of this volatile situation27.
26 More than Numbi and Nyabibwe, Rubaya’s evolution has been marked by processes of
forced displacement and an influx of IDPs and refugees. Through the different phases of
the violent conflict, IDPs and refugees have installed themselves in camps around the
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centre and in the centre itself. In 2016, the last IDP camp inside the town was closed by
the provincial governor and today two camps remain, at four and seven kilometres from
the town, respectively. Their inhabitants (mainly Hutu) represent a pool of cheap labour
for employment in cultivating the land surrounding Rubaya28. 
27 Rubaya’s big man is Robert Habinshuti Seninga—a Hutu and a much-discussed figure in
the region’s recent history. As one of former governor Serufuli’s close allies during the
RCD period, he has remained in power and has continued to use his influence (Cuvelier et
al., 2014). He is the president of COOPERAMMA, the mining cooperative in Rubaya, and
just like in Nyabibwe and Numbi, the cooperative is a major player in local governance. It
has an important stake in local politics and is itself significantly influenced by regional
and national elites (Cuvelier, 2013). One several occasions COOPERAMMA has engaged in
the physical development of the town. In 2014, the organisation bought a large piece of
land,  baptised  it  quartier  COOPERAMMA,  and  put  together  its  own  commission  (with
Seninga himself at its head) to parcel it out. In 2015, under the same commission, two
more neighbourhoods were developed on land belonging to a FARDC general29.  These
neighbourhoods are generally referred to as the ‘best developed’ in town, with more or
less  good  roads,  a  health  centre  and  spacious  parcels.  Further,  COOPERAMMA  also
regularly  invests  in  road  repairs  and  maintenance,  and  in  2014  it  installed  a  small
hydropower plant  to  provide the town with electricity  (a  project  that  largely  failed,
partially because the Congolese state imposed heavy taxes on the electricity produced)30.
COOPERAMMA’s  involvement  in  Rubaya’s  development  is  again  illustrative  of  an
urbanisation process that unfolds outside formal state planning and is the outcome of the
agency of different non-state actors. Furthermore, the involvement of big men as key
actors in this development illustrates that it is a political process, used in strategies of
legitimacy and control.  The position of these key actors within political  and military
networks reaching the provincial and national levels reinforces this political character.
This is further illustrated in the struggle for administrative control over the town in the
current context of the controversial decentralisation process.
28 Rubaya is a town with a mixed ethnic profile, with Tutsi, Hunde, Tembo, Shi and Kano,
but with a strong Hutu dominance. With its considerable size and number of inhabitants,
Rubaya is in the process of becoming a ‘commune’ in the context of the decentralisation
law.  Although customary  power  is  less  strong  in  Rubaya  than it  is,  for  example,  in
Nyabibwe, this would still influence the balance of power in the area. Within the complex
history of violent conflict in Masisi,  this balance of power is heavily coloured by the
continuous power struggles  between the so-called autochthonous population and the
Banyarwanda, and internally between the Hutu and Tutsi communities. In the first place,
it was Rubaya’s chef de poste (a Hutu), who made the ‘commune’ request to the provincial
government,  believing he would be appointed as the head of  the new administrative
entity31.  The  demand  was  further  encouraged  by  the  town’s  economic  Hutu  elite32.
However, the ‘postes de territoires’ were being abolished in North Kivu, and shortly after
any further implementation of the decentralisation law was suspended. In the context of
this  administrative  vacuum,  a  ‘provincial  delegate’  was  appointed  by  the  provincial
governor. To this day, this delegate, Bihami Serkali (a former administrator from the RCD
period) is the only official administrative representative in Rubaya, yet he has very little
legitimacy given his unclear mandate and his equally unclear juridical status. Because
Serkali  is  a  close ally  of  Seninga,  his  appointment is  generally  viewed as  a  result  of
Seninga’s political lobbying efforts and mechanisms of control33.  Especially among the
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local  Hunde  and  their  customary  chief,  there  is  strong  resentment  regarding  his
appointment, as they perceive it as a Hutu strategy to seize control over resources, such
as land and taxes, from the customary authorities34. 
 
5. Conclusion
29 These current political struggles over mining towns point to a number of dimensions of
mining urbanisation in a context of violent conflict that are of crucial academic as well as
policy importance. 
30 First of all,  they underline the fact that these places represent strategic nodes in the
dynamics of development and accumulation, as well as in the dynamics of political and
military control. These towns attract huge numbers of people from rural as well as urban
environments in the Kivu provinces and they grow at great speed. As attractive poles of
investment and livelihood diversification, for researchers as well as for policy makers, it
is  crucial  to  look  at  these  places,  given  their  transformative  power  in  processes  of
development, social change and stability. The ‘urban’ has for a long time been largely
ignored in academic and policy studies on conflict and development in Eastern Congo.
Secondary urban centres in particular have received only minor attention, yet as this
research demonstrates, they may play a central role in dynamics of conflict and peace. An
urban  reading  of  wartime  economic,  spatial  as  well  as  political  transformation  is
necessary if we are to understand current processes of rural–urban development as well
as the production of order and public authority in Eastern DRC. 
31 Second, what this chapter has demonstrated and what should further inform academic
and policy  engagement  with this  topic  is  that  these boomtowns represent  attractive
resources to tap into for a wide range of actors. Mining urbanisation involves intense
interaction between an extremely varied set of actors (political, economic, humanitarian,
civil,  military,  formal,  informal,  state  and  non-state)  and  offers  extensive  room  for
manoeuvre for their diverse agencies.  This applies not only to the rural  migrants or
displaced people seeking security and income opportunities, but also to armed groups
integrating into ethnic groups for the purpose of violent mobilisation, or to the Congolese
state  profiting  from  tax  benefits,  or  to  political  and  economic  elites  tapping  into
economic  resources  such  as  land  or  mining  activities,  or  political  resources  such  as
electoral bases. These attractive spaces of rural–urban transformation display interesting
governance arrangements between customary authorities,  state institutions,  state and
non-state military actors, big men and IDPs. 
32 Third,  given  the  fact  that  these  governance  arrangements  are  part  of  multi-scalar
alliances  involving  actors  in  Goma  or  Kinshasa  or  abroad,  the  socio-economic  and
political  dynamics  emerging  from mining  urbanisation  are  less  local  than  they  may
appear at first sight. Many of these alliances are the outcome of a historical process of
armed  conflict,  state  fragmentation  and  the  ethnic  logics  of  protection35.  In  ethnic
struggles  for  access  to  political  and economic  resources,  these  political  and military
alliances are easily mobilised. In a setting where mining cooperatives have major stakes
in  urban  planning  and  urban  governance,  the  local  regulatory  framework  of  this
boomtown process is influenced by the political stakes of external elites. Conflicts arising
from the transformation of  rural  villages  into  mining boomtowns are  as  such easily
politicized at different levels, reinforcing the towns’ larger regional influence. This has
influenced the political  character of  mining urbanisation.  The case studies of  Numbi,
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Nyabibwe  and  Rubaya  have  underlined  the  importance  of  understanding  the  rapid
development of these towns not only as a demographic, economic and spatial process, but
as a political process as well. 
33 The effects of the decentralisation reforms that change the administrative status of these
boomtowns uncover broader violent struggles for power and control, often fought along
ethnic lines. They also illustrate that interventions in these places can trigger existing
tensions and render them more violent. To capitalise upon the transformative capacity of
these places, a profound understanding is indispensable regarding their position and role
in the complex political geography of the Kivu region. 
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NOTES
1. See Radio Okapi (2014) ‘Nord-Kivu:  Création d’une radio communautaire à Rubaya’  https://
www.radiookapi.net/regions/nord-kivu/2014/06/20/nord-kivu-creation-dune-radio-
communautaire-rubaya (accessed on 1 November 2017). 
2. Organised by International Tin Association (ITA) Ltd. See Verbruggen et al. (2011) and Geenen
(2016) for more information on this supply chain traceability initiative. 
3. Urban centres providing a haven in civil conflicts is fairly common (Beall et al., 2011). The
urban  features  of  inclusiveness,  freedom,  global  connections  and  cosmopolitism  mark  the
attractiveness of cities. In the Kivu provinces, urbanised areas have become attractive poles for
IDPs because of their ethnically more diversified demographic profiles (compared to surrounding
villages),  the higher presence of NGOs or humanitarian agencies,  and the higher presence of
Congolese (as well as UN) security forces. 
4. A study undertaken by the gender section of MONUSCO in 2010 in six Congolese provinces
found  that  women  mostly  work  in  the  processing  of  mineral  tailings  (e.g.  sieving,  sorting,
transporting and washing), followed by activities related indirectly to mineral exploitation (e.g.
as small goods traders, housewives or prostitutes) (MONUSCO, 2010, cited in Bashwira, 2017, 109).
5. Rassemblement  Congolais  pour  la  Democratie  (RCD),  a  Rwandan  and  Ugandan  backed  rebel
movement  that  controlled  large  parts  of  Eastern  Congo  between  1998  and  2004.  For  more
information see Tull (2003) and Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004).
6. Statistics provided by the local health centre of Nyabibwe.
7. In 2014, the figure of 8900 inhabitants was provided by the local health centre. According to
Numbi’s local authorities, the actual number was around 11,000 or 12,000 inhabitants (interviews
with village chief and chef de poste, Numbi, April 2014).
8. For example, the local chief of a nearby village, put in place by the Tutsi chief, was murdered a
couple of days after his appointment, allegedly by members of the armed Hutu franchise group
Nyatura  (‘hit  hard’  in  Kinyarwanda).  Interview  with  an  entrepreneur  (Numbi,  April  2014) ;
Urbanisation and the Political Geographies of Violent Struggle for Power and ...
International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement, 10 | 2018
16
interview with a  mineral  buyer  (or  middleman (négotiant)  (Numbi,  April  2014).  See  also  Pole
Institute (2012). 
9. Focus group with mineral buyers/middlemen (négociants) (Numbi, April 2014) ; interview with
an entrepreneur (Numbi, April 2014). 
10. Since February 2018 known as International Tin Association (ITA) Ltd. For more information
on this supply chain traceability initiative, see Verbrugge et al. (2011) and Geenen (2016).
11. Focus  group  discussion  with  miners  (Numbi,  April  2014) ;  interview  with  a  village  chief
(Numbi, April 2014) ; author’s own observations. 
12. Interview with the manager of a Nganda or ‘popular bar’ (Nyabibwe, May 2013).
13. Focus group with traders (Nyabibwe, May 2013).
14. Focus group with motorcycle riders and interview with an FEC representative (Nyabibwe,
May 2013). Since the purchase price of a motorcycle in Goma is only USD 1,500, not only urban-
based elites but also local miners and middlemen can easily invest in this ‘market’. 
15. Interview with an official from the Division of Urbanisation and Habitat (Kalehe, May 2013).
16. Interview with an entrepreneur (Numbi, April 2014).
17. These reforms were launched in 2006 to improve governance and accountability, undermine
predation, corruption, and personal rule, bring government closer to the people, and promote
local development. However, as Englebert and Kasongo Mungongo (2016, 1) have argued : ‘As of
2014,  despite  some regional  variations,  Congolese  decentralisation had instead increased the
degree to which the state extracts the resources and incomes of its citizens’.
18. Décret n° 13/029 du 13 juin 2013 conférant le statut de ville et de commune à certaines agglomérations
de la province du Sud-Kivu. 
19. Activity Report of a local health centre ; local electoral inscription centre.
20. Interview with a former chef de poste (Rubaya, June 2017).
21. Focus group discussion with Rubaya mineral buyers and middlemen (négociants) (Goma, May
2016).
22. Interview with a teacher and interview with a priest (Rubaya, June 2017).
23. Interview with a former chef de poste (Rubaya, June 2017).
24. Essentially Hunde ; emerged in 2008. Like many of these other militias, it mobilised its forces
on the basis  of  popular resistance to the return of  Tutsi  refugees,  the defence of  traditional
Hunde land rights, and defence against the expansion of the influence of Banyarwanda in Masisi
territory.
25. This presence is not constant however, and fluctuates with periods of tension.
26. See,  for  example,  Radio  Okapi  (2016)  ‘Nord-Kivu :  9  blessés  dans  une  fusillade  à  Masisi’,
https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/01/14/actualite/societe/nord-kivu-9-blesses-dans-une-
fusillade-masisi (accessed on 1 November 2017).
27. Radio Okapi (2014) ‘Nord-Kivu : soupçons d’une présumée reconstitution du M23 à Rubaya’,
https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2014/08/30/nord-kivu-soupcons-dune-presumee-
reconstitution-du-m23-rubaya (accessed on 1 November 2017).
28. Interview with a customary chief (Rubaya, June 2017).
29. Focus group discussion with Rubaya middlemen (négociants)  (Goma, May 2016) ;  interview
with a COOPERAMMA representative (Rubaya, June 2017).
30. Focus  group  discussion  with  Rubaya  mineral  buyers/middlemen ( négociants)  (Goma,  May
2016).
31. Interview with a former chef de poste (Rubaya, June 2017).
32. Interview with a representative of the Federation of Economics and Commerce (FEC) (Rubaya,
June 2017).
33. Focus group discussion with miners (Rubaya, June 2017) ; focus group discussion with Rubaya
mineral buyers/middlemen (négociants) (Goma, May 2016). We see the same dynamics in other
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urbanising and fast-growing towns in North Kivu, including in Kitchanga (Mathys and Büscher,
forthcoming).
34. Interview with a customary chief (Rubaya, June 2017).
35. On these historical processes, see for example Raeymaekers (2010) and Tull (2003). 
ABSTRACTS
This chapter addresses rural–urban transformations in the Kivu provinces, Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC), and more particularly focuses on the complex relationship between dynamics of
violent conflict and the emergence of urban mining ‘boomtowns’. Mining towns offer fascinating
sites from which to investigate the socio-economic and spatial effects of a protracted history of
violence,  displacement  and militarisation.  They are  the spatial  outcomes  of  dynamics  of  the
transformative power of violent conflict.  Moreover,  this chapter demonstrates how they also
offer interesting spatial as well as analytical starting points from which to study the political
geographies of war dynamics in Eastern DRC. It will be argued that the reason why these mining
towns evolve into strategic ‘resources’ in violent struggles for power and control is to be found in
their urban character as much as in the presence of natural resources.  As such, this chapter
analyses  the process  of  mining urbanisation in  the Kivu provinces  as  part  of  (armed)  elites’
spatial  politics  of  power and  control.  As  demographic  concentrations  and  economic  nodes,
mining towns represent important political, economic and social resources for ‘big men’, armed
groups and the Congolese state in their broader political struggles for power, legitimacy and
authority. In a context of fragmented and multi-scalar governance, the urbanisation process of
these  towns  is  the  outcome of  a  complex  interaction and contestation  of  different  forms of
agency. Based on three ethnographic cases of mining towns that emerged from diverse dynamics
of  artisanal  mining  activities  and  forced  displacement,  this  chapter  contributes  to  broader
academic  and  policy  debates  on  the  political  nature  of  mining  urbanisation  in  a  context  of
conflict and fragmented governance.
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